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Abstract
We consider a problem of automated orchestration of security-aware services under additional
constraints. The problem of finding a mediator to compose secured services has been reduced
in previous works to the problem of solving deducibility constraints similar to those employed
for cryptographic protocol analysis. We extend in this paper the mediator synthesis procedure
(i.e. a solution for the orchestration problem) by allowing additional non-disclosure policies
that express the fact that some data is not accessible to the mediator at a given point of
its execution. We present a decision procedure that answers the question whether a mediator
satisfying these policies can be effectively synthesized. The approach presented in this work
extends the constraint solving procedure for cryptographic protocol analysis in a significant way
as to be able to handle negation of deducibility constraints. It applies to all subterm convergent
theories and therefore covers several interesting theories in formal security analysis including
encryption, hashing, signature and pairing; it is also expressive enough for some RBAC policies.
A variant of this procedure for Dolev Yao theory has been implemented in Cl-Atse, a protocol
analysis tool based on constraint solving.
Key words: Web services, orchestration, security policy, separation of duty, deducibility
constraints, cryptographic protocols, formal methods, automated verification, synthesis
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1. Introduction
1.1. Context
Trust and security management in distributed frameworks is known to be a non-trivial
critical issue. It is particularly challenging in Service Oriented Architecture where services
can be discovered and composed in a dynamic way. Implemented solutions should meet
the seemingly antinomic goals of openness and flexibility on one hand and compliance
with data privacy and other regulations on the other hand. We have demonstrated in
previous works (Chevalier et al., 2008, 2012; Avanesov et al., 2012a) that functional
agility can be achieved for services with a message-level security policy by providing an
automated service synthesis algorithm. It resolves a system of deducibility constraints
by synthesizing a mediator that may adapt, compose and analyze messages exchanged
between client services and having the functionalities specified by a goal service. It is
complete as long as the security policies only apply to the participants in the orchestration
and not on the synthesized service nor on who is able to participate. However security
policies often include such non-deducibility constraints on the mediator. For instance
an organisation may not be trusted to efficiently protect the customer’s data against
attackers even though it is well-meaning. In this case a client would require that the
mediator synthesized to interact with this organization must not have direct access to
her private data, which is an effective protection even in case of total compromise. Also
it is not possible to specify that the mediator enforces e.g. dynamic separation of duty,
i.e., restrictions on the possible participants based on the messages exchanged.
Since checking whether a solution computed by our previous algorithm satisfies the
non-deducibility constraints is not complete, we propose in this paper to solve during the
automated synthesis of the mediator both deducibility and non-deducibility constraints.
The former are employed to specify a mediator that satisfies the functional requirements
and the security policy on the messages exchanged by the participants whereas the latter
are employed to enforce a security policy on the mediator and the participants to the
orchestration.
1.1.1. Original contribution.
We have previously proposed some decision procedures (Chevalier et al., 2008, 2012;
Avanesov et al., 2012a) for generating a mediator from a high-level specification with
deducibility constraints of a goal service. In this paper, we extend the formalism to
include non-deducibility constraints in the specification of the mediator. Then we provide
a decision procedure for the resulting class of constraint systems and therefore solve the
mediator synthesis problem in this setting. This paper extends the previous publication
(Avanesov et al., 2012b) in several aspects: the proofs are reorganized and improved;
? This work is supported by FP7 AVANTSSAR (AVANTSSAR, 2008–2010) and FP7 NESSoS (NESSoS,
2010–2014) projects.
Email addresses: tigran.avanesov@uni.lu (Tigran Avanesov), ychevali@irit.fr (Yannick
Chevalier), rusi@loria.fr (Michael Rusinowitch), mathieu.turuani@loria.fr (Mathieu Turuani).
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all omitted reasonings are included; the details on the implementation of the decision
procedure for Dolev Yao theory within the Cl-Atse tool are given; and the experimental
results for a Loan Origination Process case study with and without non-deducibility
constraints are analyzed.
1.1.2. Related works.
In order to understand and anticipate potential flaws in complex composition sce-
narios, several approaches have been proposed for the formal specification and analysis
of secure services (Armando et al., 2012; Costa et al., 2011; Armando and Ponta, 2014;
Armando et al., 2013; Viganò, 2012, 2013). Among the works dedicated to trust in multi-
agent systems, the models closest to ours are (Herzig et al., 2010; Lorini and Demolombe,
2008) in which one can express that an agent trusts another agent in doing or forbearing
of doing an action that leads to some goal. To our knowledge no work has previously con-
sidered the automatic orchestration of security services with policies altogether as ours.
However there are some interesting related attempts to analyze security protocols and
trust management (Martinelli, 2005; Frau and Dashti, 2011). In (Martinelli, 2005) the
author uniformly models security protocols and access control based on trust manage-
ment. The work introduces an elegant approach to model automated trust negotiation.
We also consider an integrated framework for protocols and policies but in our case i)
policies can be explicitly negative such as non-disclosure policies and separation-of-duty
ii) we propose a decision procedure for the related trust negotiation problem iii) we do
not consider indistinguishability properties. In (Frau and Dashti, 2011) security pro-
tocols are combined with authorization logics that can be expressed with acyclic Horn
clauses. The authors encode the derivation of authorization predicates (for a service) as
subprotocols and can reuse in that way the constraint solving algorithm from (Millen
and Shmatikov, 2001; Comon-Lundh et al., 2010) to obtain a decision procedure. In our
case we consider more general intruder theories (subterm convergent ones) but focus on
negation. We conjecture that our approach applies to their authorization policies too.
Our decision procedure for general (negative and positive) constraints extends (Corin
et al., 2006) where negative constraints are limited to have ground terms in right-hand
sides, and the deduction system is the Dolev-Yao system (Dolev and Yao, 1983), a special
instance of the subterm deduction systems we consider here. In (Kähler et al., 2007) the
authors study a class of contract signing protocols where some very specific Dolev-Yao
negative constraints are implicitly handled (in particular only Dolev-Yao standard case
is considered).
Finally one should note that the non deducibility constraints we consider tell that
some data cannot be disclosed globally but they cannot express finer-grained privacy
or information leakage notions relying on probability such as for instance differential
privacy.
1.1.3. Paper organization.
In Section 2 we give motivating examples. In Subsection 2.1 we introduce a banking
application and sketch our approach to obtain a mediator service. To our knowledge this
application is out of the scope of alternative automatic methods.
In Section 3 we present our formal setting. A deduction system (Subsection 3.2) de-
scribes the abilities of the mediator to process the messages. The mediator synthesis
problem is reduced to the resolution of constraints that are defined in Subsection 3. In
Section 4 we recall the class of subterm deduction systems and their properties. These
systems have nice properties that allow us to decide in Section 5 the satisfiability of
deducibility constraints even with negation. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
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Composition rules Decomposition rules
x, y → pair (x, y) pair (x, y) → x
pair (x, y) → y
x, y → {|x|}y y, {|x|}y → x
x, y → {x}y inv (y) , {x}y → x
x, inv (y) → {x}siginv(y) y, {x}
sig
inv(y) → x
x, rel(x, y) → y
y, rel(x, y) → x
Figure 1. Deduction system for the LOP example.
2. Motivating examples
2.1. Synthesis of a Loan Origination Process (LOP)
We illustrate how negative constraints are needed to express elaborated policies such
as Separation of Duty by a classical loan origination process example. Our goal is to
synthesize a mediator that selects two bank clerks satisfying the Separation of Duty
policy to manage the client request. Such a problem is solved automatically by the
decision procedure proved in the following sections. Let us walk through the specification
of the different parts of the orchestration problem.
2.1.1. Formal setting.
Data are represented by first-order terms defined on a signature that comprises binary
symbols for symmetric and asymmetric encryptions (resp. {| |} , { } ), signature ({ }sig),
and pairing (pair). Given a public key k we write inv (k) its associated private key. For
example {a}siginv(k) is the signature of a by the owner of the pair of public and private
keys k, inv (k). For readability we write a.b.c a term pair (a,pair (b, c)). The construction
rel( , ) expresses that two agents are related and is used for defining a Separation of
Duty policy. A unary symbol g is employed to designate the participants’ identity in the
“relatives” database.
A set of possible operations on data (represented by terms) is expressed in a form of
so-called deduction rules shown in Fig. 1. These are split into two categories, composition
and decomposition rules. The former are used to ”compose” more complex term from
simpler pieces while the latter play the inverse role of extracting a piece from a composed
term. Everything that an agent can compute is deducible through this system from his
initial knowledge plus the fresh data he generated (nonces) and the messages he received
from external entities. As formally defined later in Section 3 this gives life to derivations,
i.e. sequences of ground deduction rules augmented with nonce generations and message
receptions, where any term in the left-hand side of a rule is somewhere in the right-
hand sides of previous rules. A derivation shows exactly which data an agent chooses to
compute (among the infinite ones) and how he do it. The deduction capabilities defined
here matches the so-called Dolev-Yao model with non-atomic keys, slightly augmented
with two rules for rel.
4
Clerk’s (A) communications:
∗ ⇒ A : request.M
A ⇒ M : g(A).pk (A)
M ⇒ A : {Amnt.C.K}pk(A)
A ⇒ M : {h(A.Amnt.C.RespA)}siginv(pk(A)).{|RespA|}K
Non-disclosure policy:
(1) M cannot deduce the fourth message before it is sent by A.
(2) M cannot deduce identity of the clerk (i.e. g(A)) before it is sent by A (done in
the second message).
Figure 2. Clerk’s communications and non-disclosure constraints
2.1.2. Client and clerks.
The client and the clerks are specified by services with a security policy, specifying
the cryptographic protections and the data and security tokens, and a business logic that
specifies the sequence in which the operations may be invoked. These are compiled into
a sequence of protected messages each service is willing to follow, as in Fig. 2 and 3
for the clerk and the client, and following the Alice-Bob notation. Within this notation,
A⇒ B: M is one protocol step, run after those above and before those under, where agent
A sends the message M to agent B. When an agent name is unknown or irrelevant, ∗
is used instead. For consistency, an agent can only send messages that he knows or
can create, and any run of the protocol will be described by a derivation showing the
communications with agents in the exact same order as in each agent’s specification.
Client C wants to ask for a loan from a service P , but for this he needs to get an
approval from two banking clerks. He declares his intention by signing and sending to
mediator M a message containing service name P and the identity of the client g(C).
The mediator should send back the names of two clerks A and B who will evaluate
his request. The client then sends to each clerk a request containing amount Amnt, his
name C and a fresh key Nk which should be used to encrypt decisions. Each request
is encrypted with a public key of the corresponding clerk (pk(A) or pk(B)). Then the
mediator must furnish the decisions (Ra and Rb) of the two clerks, each encrypted with
the proposed key Nk and accompanied by their signatures. Finally, the client uses these
tokens to ask for his loan from P , where pk(P ) is a public key of P .
A clerk receives a request to participate in a LOP which is conducted by the mediator
M . If he accepts, he returns his identity and public key. Then he receives the client’s
request containing data to process to evaluate the loan: the amount Amnt, the client’s
name C and a temporary key K to encrypt his decision. That decision is sent back
together with a signature certifying its authenticity in relation to the given request.
The client’s non-disclosure policy is given in Fig. 3 and is self-explanatory. Let us
explain the services’ non-disclosure policy. The clerk’s decision (its last message) should
be unforgeable, thus, it should not be known by the Mediator before it was sent by the
clerk (first non-disclosure constraint of Fig. 2). The second non-disclosure constraint of
Fig. 2 expresses that the clerk A can be used by the mediator only if the constraint \g(A)
is satisfied, i.e., that A is not a relative with any other actor of the protocol, as either
the client or the other clerk.
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Client’s (C) communications:
C ⇒ M : {g(C).loan.P}siginv(pk(C))
M ⇒ C : A.B
C ⇒ M : {Amnt.C.Nk}pk(A) . {Amnt.C.Nk}pk(B)
M ⇒ C : {h(A.Amnt.C.Ra)}siginv(pk(A)) .{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C.Rb)}siginv(pk(B)) .{|Rb|}Nk
C ⇒ P : {Amnt.C.A.Ra.B.Rb}pk(P ) . {h(A.Amnt.C.Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A)) .{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C.Rb)}siginv(pk(B)) .{|Rb|}Nk
Non-disclosure policy:
(1) M cannot deduce the amount Amnt.
(2) M cannot deduce A’s decision Ra.
(3) M cannot deduce B’s decision Rb.
Figure 3. Client’s Communications and non-disclosure constraints
2.1.3. Goal service.
In contrast with the other services and clients, the goal service is only described in
terms of possible operations and available initial data.
Initial data. Beside his private/public keys and the public keys of potential partners (e.g.
pk (P )) the goal service has access to a relational database denoted rel(g(a), g(c)),
rel(g(b), g(c)), . . . for storing known existing relations between agents to be checked
against conflict of interests.
Deduction rules. The access to the database as well as the possible operations on mes-
sages are modeled by a set of deduction rules (formally defined later). We anticipate
on the rest of this paper, and present the rules specific to this case study grouped
into composition and decomposition rules in Fig. 1.
2.1.4. Mediator synthesis problem.
In order to communicate with the services (here the client, the clerks and the service
P ), a mediator has to satisfy a sequence of constraints expressing that (i) each message m
expected by a service (denoted ?m) can be deduced from all the previously sent messages
m′ (denoted !m′) and the initial knowledge, and (ii) each message w that should not be
known or disclosed by the mediator (denoted \w and called negative constraint) is not
deducible at that point in the process.
The orchestration problem consists in finding a satisfying interleaving of the con-
straints imposed by each service. Since the mediator has a central position in the message
exchanges, we can safely assume that all the messages goes through him. That is, each
time A sends a message to B, he send it to the mediator M instead who will forward it to
B. If needed the identity of B can be paired with the message to make it clear to M . One
could argue that this simplification increases the knowledge of the mediator and thus,
limits the solutions to the negative constraints. However, this is fine because a malicious
mediator could anyway listen to and change these messages (e.g. man-in-the-middle at-
tack), and thus, they must be counted as knowledges for the negative constraints even
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if not officially going through the mediator. For instance, the clerk’s and the client’s
constraints extracted from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 are:
Client(C)
∆
= ! {g(C).loan.P}siginv(KC) ?A.B
! {Amnt.C.Nk}pk(A) . {Amnt.C.Nk}pk(B)
? {h(A.Amnt.C.Ra)}siginv(pk(A)) .{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C.Rb)}siginv(pk(B)) .{|Rb|}Nk
\Amnt \RA \RB
! {Amnt.C.A.Ra.B.Rb}pk(P ) . {h(A.Amnt.C.Ra)}
sig
inv(pk(A)) .{|Ra|}Nk .
{h(B.Amnt.C.Rb)}siginv(pk(B)) .{|Rb|}Nk
Clerk(A)
∆
= ?request.M \g(A) !g(A).pk (A) ? {Amnt.C.K}pk(A)
\ {h(A.Amnt.C.RespA)}siginv(pk(A)) .{|RespA|}K
! {h(A.Amnt.C.RespA)}siginv(pk(A)) .{|RespA|}K
Here, each client’s or clerk’s list of constraints consists in a sequence of actions or
assumptions presented in the order in which they must be performed or validated. For
example, ?A.B in Client(C) means that C must receive a pair of clerk’s names A.B
from the mediator somewhere after sending his first message (declaration of intention)
and before sending his second (requests to each clerk). Similarly, \Amnt in Client(C)
says that C cannot continue to run in the protocol past this point if the mediator knows or
can deduce Amnt. Each interleaving of these constraints preserving the partial orderings
plus some sanity properties (origination, determination) shown in Section 3 is called a
constraint system, and consists in a single sequence of constraints for the client and the
clerks fused together and communicating with the mediator. A solution to a constraint
system is a derivation for the mediator showing that he can validate all the constraints
in the system in sequence, i.e. with the same ordering he i) can create any message
t expected by an agent (?t) from his initial knowledge plus the nonces he generated
(fresh data) and the messages sent to him earlier in the derivation; ii) cannot create any
message t in a negative constraint (\t) from his knowledge plus the nonces he generated
and the messages sent to him earlier in the derivation. Since any constraint system has
the same length as the orchestration problem from which it is derived, and since we
target an NP decision procedure for building a solution (derivation) to that problem, we
assume for simplicity in the rest of this paper that a single ordering has been chosen
already, and thus, that only one constraint system needs to be checked. The result can
then be trivially lifted to finding a solution for an orchestration problem by guessing
together one constraint system (same length) and one derivation (bounded by some fixed
and known polynom), and then checking at the same time if the constraint system is a
satisfiable ordering of the orchestration problem and if the derivation is indeed a solution
to it. A solution produced by our procedure can then be translated automatically into a
mediator (the derivation is complete). An example of this is shown in Section 6.3. Note,
for example, that without the negative constraint \g(A) a synthesized mediator might
accept any clerk identity and that could violate the Separation of Duty policy.
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2.2. Expressing Role Based Access Control mechanisms
We show now how our service synthesis method can accommodate constraints derived
from Role Based Access Control policies (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). Role Based Access
Control (RBAC in short) has been introduced in organizations to simplify the manage-
ment of individual user rights. Users can be assigned some roles, and through these roles
obtain permissions to perform various operations. For illustration purpose we present
below some RBAC policies and their encoding.
Let us first give some notations:
• atomic permission: a1(X), . . . , ak(X), where ai represents a permission and X is
an agent, i.e. a1(b) stands for “agent b has a permission a1”
1 ;
• role: A role is represented by a function symbol that, for the purpose of RBAC
modelling, is applied on the set of atomic permissions and a set of inherited roles,
also modelled by similar terms;
• role hierarchy: Roles can be hierarchically organized. Higher-level roles inherit per-
missions owned by sub-roles. For example, a “project leader” role subsumes a “pro-
grammer” role, since all atomic permissions of the “programmer” role are inherited
by the “project leader” role.
Assume that a “project leader” role is assigned to some agent X. This will be rep-
resented by the following term where the root symbol is the highest role of X in the
hierarchy and its arguments list contains the specific permissions given to a“project
leader” (e.g. can fire programmer) and the sub-roles inherited from the hierarchy (here
programmer):
Rleader(can fire programmer(X), Rprogrammer(can commit(X)))
We add to the current deduction rules of Figure 1 some extra rules Rleader(X1, X2)→
Xi, for i ∈ {1, 2} and Rprogrammer(Y )→ Y . These rules encode the possibility to obtain
all available atomic permissions from a role, as well as all permissions from sub-roles of
the hierarchy.
To be able to assign a project leader role to an agent, the following agent’s actions
may be used:
?X!Rleader(can fire programmer(X), can commit(X), Rprogrammer(can commit(X)))
2.2.1. Delegation of rights
A simple pair of receive-send actions may be used to specify a delegation, where Agent
X delegates to Agent Y a right a1 that X has:
?X.Y.a1(X) !deleg(X,Y, a1(X), a1(Y ))
An extra deduction rule is required too: deleg(X,Y, Z, T ) → T 2 . Once the right is
delegated, this rule permits to infer that right.
Note that a simplified encoding of the right delegation property ?X.Y.a1(X) !a1(Y )
that avoids using deleg symbol does not permit one to forbid a delegation at some point
using the \ policy; however with deleg symbol it is possible: \deleg(X,Y, a1(X), a1(Y ))
ensures that the agent X has not delegated right a1 to agent Y (see also § 2.2.4).
1 The notation can be extended to take into account objects in order to express policies like “agent b
has permission a1 on object c”.
2 We might also add X,Y, Z to the right hand side, but these values are supposed to be known.
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2.2.2. Separation of roles
This policy specifies that an agent cannot play two specific roles. To express such a
policy in a service composition we simply append at the end:
\(R̄clerk(X).R̄client(X))
That is, R̄clerk(X) and R̄client(X) are not known at the same time, meaning that X does
not play clerk and client roles in parallel.
2.2.3. Separation of duties
This policy specifies that an agent cannot have two specific permissions at the same
time. To express such a policy we simply add:
\(a(X).b(X))
2.2.4. Delegation restriction
An agent A can be forbidden to delegate some right a. To express such a policy in a
service composition we simply add:
\(a(A).deleg(A,X, a(A), a(X)))
3. Derivations and constraint systems
In our setting, messages are terms generated or obtained according to some elementary
rules called deduction rules. A derivation is a sequence of deduction rules applied by a
mediator to build new messages. The goal of the synthesis is specified by a constraint
system, i.e. a sequence of terms labelled by symbols !,? or \, respectively sent, received,
or unknown at some step of the process.
3.1. Terms and substitutions
Let X be a set of variables, F be a set of function symbols and C be a set of con-
stants. The set of terms T is the minimal set containing X , C and if t1, . . . , tk ∈ T then
f(t1, . . . , tk) ∈ T for any f ∈ F with arity k. The set of subterms of a term t is de-
noted Sub(t) and is the minimal set containing t such that f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Sub(t) implies
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(t) for f ∈ F . We denote Vars (t) the set X ∩ Sub(t). A term t is ground
is Vars (t) = ∅. We denote Tg the set of ground terms.
A substitution σ is an idempotent mapping from X to T . The application of a sub-
stitution σ on a term t is denoted tσ and is equal to the term t where each variable
x has been replaced by the term xσ. The domain of σ (denoted by dom (σ)) is set:
{x ∈ X : xσ 6= x}. The image of σ is img (σ) = {xσ : x ∈ dom (σ)}. A substitution σ is
ground if img (σ) ⊆ Tg. We say that a substitution σ is injective on a set of terms T , iff
for all p, q ∈ T pσ = qσ implies p = q. Given two substitutions σ, δ, the substitution σδ
has for domain dom (σ)∪dom (δ) and is defined by xσδ = (xσ)δ. If dom (σ)∩dom (δ) = ∅
we write σ ∪ δ instead of σδ.
A unification system U is a finite set of equations {pi =? qi}1≤i≤n where pi, qi ∈ T .
A substitution σ is a unifier of U or equivalently satisfies U iff for all i = 1, . . . , n,
piσ = qiσ. Any satisfiable unification system U admits a most general unifier mgu (U),
unique modulo variable renaming, and such that for any unifier σ of U there exists
a substitution τ such that σ = mgu (U) τ . We assume in the rest of this paper that
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Vars (img (mgu (U))) ⊆ Vars (U), i.e., the most general unifier does not introduce new
variables.
A sequence s is indexed by [1, . . . , n] with n ∈ N. We write |s| the length of s, ∅ the
empty sequence, s[i] the i-th element of s, s[m : n] the sequence s[m], . . . , s[n] and s, s′
the concatenation of two sequences s and s′. We write e ∈ s and E ⊆ s instead of,
respectively, there exists i such that s[i] = e and for all e ∈ E we have e ∈ s.
While not explicited, the size of any object is assumed to be linear (with some fixed
coef.) in the DAG-size of the set of it’s elements.
3.2. Deduction systems
The new values created by the mediator are constants in a subset Cmed of C. We
assume that both Cmed and C \ Cmed are infinite. Given l1, . . . , ln, r ∈ T , the notation
l1, . . . , ln → r denotes a deduction rule if Var(r) ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Var(li). A deduction is a ground
instance of a deduction rule. A deduction system is a set of deduction rules that contains
a finite set of deduction rules in addition to all nonce creation rules → n (one for every
n ∈ Cmed) and all reception rules ?t (one for every t ∈ T ). All rules but the reception rules
are called standard rules. The deduction system describes the abilities of the mediator
to process the messages. In the rest of this section we fix an arbitrary deduction system
D. We denote by l ∗→ r any rule and l→ r any standard rule.
3.3. Derivations and localizations
A derivation is a sequence of deductions, including receptions of messages from avail-
able services, performed by the mediator. Given a sequence of deductions E = (li ∗→
ri)i=1,...,m we denote RE (i) the set {rj : j ≤ i}.
Definition 3.1 (Derivation). A sequence of deductions D = (li ∗→ ri)i=1,...,m is a
derivation if for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, li ⊆ RD (i− 1).
Given a derivation D we define NextD(i) = min({|D|+ 1}∪{j : j > i and D[j] =?tj}).
The explicit knowledge of the mediator is the set of terms it has already deduced, and
its implicit knowledge is the set of terms it can deduce. If the former is K we denote the
latter Der(K). A derivation D is a proof of t ∈ Der(K) if ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K, and
D[|D|] = l ∗→ t. Thus, we have:
Der(K) = {t : ∃D derivation s.t. ?r ∈ D implies r ∈ K, and D[|D|] = l→ t}
3.4. Constraint systems
Definition 3.2 (Constraint system). A constraint system S is a sequence of constraints
where each constraint has one of three forms (where t is a term):
(1) ?t, denoting a message reception by an available service or a client,
(2) !t, denoting a message emission by an available service or a client,
(3) \t, a negative constraint, denoting that the mediator must not be able to deduce t
at this point;
and that satisfies the following properties for any 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|:
Origination: if S[i] =!ti then Vars (ti) ⊆
⋃
j<i Vars ({tj : S[j] =?tj});
Determination: if S[i] = \ti then Vars (ti) ⊆
⋃
j Vars ({tj : S[j] =?tj}).
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Figure 4. A constraint system and a compliant derivation
Origination means that every unknown in a service’s state originates from previous
input by the mediator. Determination means that negative constraints are on messages
determined by a service’s state at the end of its execution.
In the rest of this paper, S (and decorations thereof) denotes a constraint system. An
index i is a send (resp. a receive) index if S[i] =!t (resp. S[i] =?t) for some term t. If
i1, . . . , ik is the sequence of all send (resp. receive) indices in S we denote Out(S) (resp.
In(S)) the sequence S[i1], . . . ,S[ik]. We note that the origination and determination
properties imply Var(S) = Var(In(S)). Given 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| we denote prevS(i) to be
max({0} ∪ {j : j ≤ i and S[j] =!tj}).
Definition 3.3 (Solution of a constraint system). A ground substitution σ is a solution
of S, and we denote σ |= S, if dom (σ) = Var(S) and
(1) if S[i] =?t then tσ ∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj})
(2) if S[i] = \t then tσ /∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj})
Definition 3.4 (Compliant derivations). Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ) =
Var(S). A derivation D is (S, σ)-compliant if there exists a strictly increasing bijective
mapping α from the send indices of S to the set {j : D[j] =?r} such that S[i] =!t implies
D[α(i)] =?tσ.
An example of (S, σ)-compliant derivation is shown in Figure 4. Since a sequence of
receptions is a derivation, we note that for every ground substitution σ with dom (σ) =
Var(In(S)) there exists at least one compliant derivation D.
Definition 3.5 (Proof of a solution). Let σ be a ground substitution. A derivation D is
a proof of σ |= S, and we denote D,σ, α ` S, if:
(1) D is (S, σ)-compliant with the mapping α and
(2) if S[i] =?t there is j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) such that D[i] = l ∗→ tσ and
(3) if S[i] = \t then tσ /∈ Der({tjσ : j ≤ prevS(i) and S[j] =!tj}).
In Figure 4, if σ is a solution of S and, for example, t1σ = r2, t2σ /∈ Der(∅), t4σ = r4,
t6σ /∈ Der({r3, r6}) and t7σ = r8 then D is a proof of σ |= S.
A technical subtility induced by the negative constraints is that it is easier to work on
derivations that are not necessarily solutions of the constraint system and prove that if the
constraint system is satisfiable one of these derivations is among its proofs. Accordingly,
we define maximal derivations with regard to a set of terms T and a substitution σ as
a derivation in which every subterm of T whose σ-instance is deducible is deduced as
soon as possible (Def. 3.6). Then we prove that if a derivation D is (T, σ)-maximal and
(T ′, σ′) extends in a natural way (T, σ) then D can be extended into a (T ′, σ′)-maximal
derivation (Lemma 2). This lemma can be applied on any (S, σ) compliant derivation to
obtain a (S, σ) compliant (Sub(S), σ) maximal derivation. Such derivations are proofs of
σ |= S if σ satisfies S (Lemma 1).
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Definition 3.6 (Maximal derivation). Let T be a finite set of terms and σ be a ground
substitution with dom (σ) = Var(T ). A derivation D is (T, σ)-maximal if for every t ∈
Sub(T ), tσ ∈ Der(RD (i)) iff tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1).
First we prove that maximal derivations are natural proof candidates of σ |= S by
showing that whether an individual constraint is satisfied by a substitution σ can be read
on a maximal compliant derivation.
Lemma 1. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ) = Var(S) and D be a (S, σ)-
compliant (Sub(S), σ)-maximal derivation. Then σ |= S iff for all i
• if S[i] =?t then there exists j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) : D[j] = l ∗→ tσ and
• if S[i] = \t then for all j < NextD(α(prevS(i))) : D[j] 6= l ∗→ tσ.
In the next lemma we show that any (T, σ)-maximal derivation D may be extended
into a (T ′, σ′)-maximal derivation for an arbitrary extension T ′, σ′ of T, σ by adding into
D only standard deductions.
Lemma 2. Let σ be a ground substitution with dom (σ) = Var(S). Let T1, T2 be two sets
of terms such that T1 ⊆ T2, and σ1, σ2 be two substitutions such that dom (σ1) = Var(T1)
and dom (σ2) = Var(T2)\Var(T1). If D is a (T1, σ1)-maximal (S, σ)-compliant derivation
in which no term is deduced twice by a standard rule, then there exists a (T2, σ1 ∪ σ2)-
maximal (S, σ)-compliant derivation D′ in which no term is deduced twice by a standard
rule such that every deduction whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ1 occurs in D
′ iff it
occurs in D.
Proof. Let i1, . . . , ik be the indices of the non-standard rules in D, let D[ij ] =?tij ,
and let for 0 ≤ j ≤ k Dj = D[ij + 1 : ij+1 − 1] with i0 = 0 and ik+1 = |D| + 1.
That is, D = D0, ?ti1 , D1, ?ti2 , D2, . . .?tik , Dk. Noting that dom (σ1) ∩ dom (σ2) = ∅ let
σ′ = σ1 ∪ σ2.
For each t ∈ Sub(T2) such that tσ′ ∈ Der(ti1 , . . . , tik) let it be minimal such that
tσ′ ∈ Der(ti1 , . . . , tit), and let E0t be a proof of this fact, and Et be a sequence of
standard deductions obtained by removing every non-standard deduction from E0t .
For 0 ≤ j ≤ k let D′j be the sequence of standard deduction steps Dj , Es1 , . . . , Esp
for all sm ∈ Sub(T2)σ′ \ Sub(T1)σ′ such that ism = j in which every rule of Es1 , . . . , Esp
that deduces a term previously deduced in the sequence or for some m ≤ j deduced in
D′m or in D[im] is removed.
Let D′ = D′0, ?ti1 , D
′
1, . . . , ?tik , D
′
k. We have deleted in each E
0
t only deductions whose
right-hand side occurs before in D′, and thus D′ is a derivation. Since the D′i contains
only standard deductions, we can see that D′ is (S, σ)-compliant.
Since D is (T1, σ1)-maximal and no term is deduced twice in D we note that, for
t ∈ T1, no standard deduction of tσ1 from a sequence Dj is deleted. Furthermore we note
that standard deductions of terms in Sub(T2)σ2 that are also in Sub(T1)σ1 are deleted
by construction and by the maximality of D. Thus a deduction whose right-hand side is
in Sub(T1)σ1 is in D
′ iff it occurs in D.
By construction D′ is (T2, σ
′)-maximal and no term is deduced twice by standard
deductions. 2
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Informally, the condition on the deductions whose right-hand side is in Sub(T1)σ
enforces that the constructed derivation D′ is an extension of D with new deductions.
Taking T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), and σ2 = σ, Lemma 2 implies that for every substitution
σ of domain Var(S) there exists a (S, σ)-compliant (Sub(S), σ)-maximal derivation D.
By Lemma 1 if σ |= S then D is a proof of σ |= S. Since the converse is trivial, it suffices
to search proofs maximal with regard to T ⊇ Sub(S).
Lemma 3. If σ |= S then there exists a (S, σ)-compliant and (Sub(S), σ)-maximal
derivation D and α such that D,σ, α ` S.
4. Subterm deduction system
In this section we will prove some properties on derivations allowing us to show bounds
on sets of terms from which the derivations’ messages are instantiated (Lemma 5 and 8).
Moreover, we also introduce the notion of milestone sequences Definition 4.3, which are
maximal sequences of constraints matching a derivation with “good” subterm properties.
The purpose is to identify in Section 5 particular solutions to constraint systems which
sizes are bounded by a fixed polynom that we can compute.
4.1. Definition and main property
We say that a deduction system is a subterm deduction system whenever each deduc-
tion rule which is not a nonce creation or a message reception is either:
(1) x1, . . . , xn → f(x1, . . . , xn) for a function symbol f ;
(2) l1, . . . , ln → r for some terms l1, . . . , ln, r such that r ∈
⋃n
i=1 Sub(li).
A composition rule is either a message reception, a nonce creation, or a rule of the first
type. A deduction rule is otherwise a decomposition rule. In the rest of this paper we
will usually also write (de)composition rule to denote a ground instance of one such rule.
Reachability problems for deduction systems with a convergent equational theory are
reducible to the satisfiability of a constraint system in the empty theory for a deduction
system in our setting (Lynch and Meadows, 2005; Kourjieh, 2009). If furthermore the
equational theory is subterm (Baudet, 2005) the reduction is to a subterm deduction
system as just defined above.
Now we show that if D,σ, α ` S, a term s ∈ Sub(D) is either the instance of a
non-variable subterm of Out(S) or deduced by a standard composition.
Lemma 4. Let σ be a ground substitution such that σ |= S. If D is a proof of σ |= S
such that no term is deduced twice in D by standard rules and s is a term such that
s ∈ Sub(D) and s /∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \ X )σ then there exists an index i in D such that
D[i] = l→ s is a composition rule and s /∈ Sub(RD (i− 1)).
Proof. First we note that by definition of subterm deduction systems for any decompo-
sition rule l → r we have a) r ∈ Sub(l), and b) for any composition rule l → r we have
l ⊂ Sub(r) and Sub(r) \ Sub(l) = {r}.
Let D be a proof of σ |= S, and let i be minimal such that D[i] = lr ∗→ r with
s ∈ Sub(r). Since lr ⊆ RD (i− 1), the minimality of i implies s ∈ Sub(r) \ Sub(lr).
Thus by a) D[i] cannot be a decomposition.
If D[i] =?r then by the (S, σ)-compliance of D we have S[α−1(i)] =!t with tσ = r and
t ∈ Sub(Out(S)). We have s ∈ Sub(r) = Sub(tσ) = (Sub(t)\Vars (t))σ∪Sub(Vars (t)σ).
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If s ∈ (Sub(Out(S)) \ X )σ we are done, otherwise there exists y ∈ Vars (t) with
s ∈ Sub(yσ). By the origination property, there exists k < α−1(i) such that S[k] =?t′
with y ∈ Vars (t′). Since D,σ, α ` S and k < α−1(i) there exists j < i such that
D[j] = lj → t′σ. The minimality of i is contradicted by s ∈ Sub(t′σ).
Therefore, D[i] = lr → r is an instance of a standard composition rule. As a conse-
quence, Sub(r) \ Sub(lr) = {r}. Since s ∈ Sub(r) \ Sub(lr), we finally obtain s = r. 2
4.2. Locality
Subterm deduction systems are not necessarily local in the sense of (McAllester, 1993).
However we prove in this subsection that given σ, there exists a finite extension T of
Sub(S) and an extension σ′ of σ of domain Var(T ) and a (T, σ′)-maximal derivation D in
which every deduction relevant to the proof of σ |= S is liftable into a deduction between
terms in T . Let us first clarify the above statements.
Definition 4.1 (Localization set). A set of terms T localizes a derivation D = (li ∗→
ri)1≤i≤m for a substitution σ of domain Var(T ) if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m if D[i] is a standard
rule and there exists t ∈ Sub(T ) \ X such that tσ = ri, there exists t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(T )
such that {t1σ, . . . , tnσ} ⊆ RD (i− 1) and t1, . . . , tn → t is the instance of a standard
deduction rule.
First, we prove that for subterm deduction systems, every proof D of σ |= S is localized
by a set T of DAG size linear in the DAG size of S. Note that the coefficient for this
linearity is bounded by the size of the deduction system.
Lemma 5. If σ is a ground substitution such that σ |= S there exists T ⊇ Sub(S) of
size bounded by v × |Sub(S)| (with v the size of the deduction system), a substitution
τ of domain Var(T ) \ Var(S) and a (T, σ ∪ τ)-maximal and (S, σ)-compliant derivation
localized by T for σ ∪ τ .
Proof. By Lemma 2 applied with T1 = ∅, T2 = Sub(S), σ1 = ∅, σ2 = σ, and D0 the
(S, σ)-compliant derivation that has no standard deductions, there exists a (Sub(S), σ)-
maximal (S, σ)-compliant derivation D in which no term is deduced twice by a standard
deduction. From now on we let T0 = Sub(S).
Let {li → ri}1≤i≤n be the set of decompositions in D, and {(Li → Ri, τi)}1≤i≤n be a
set of decomposition rules and ground substitutions such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
Liτi → Riτi = li → ri. Since no term in D is deduced twice by a standard deduction, by
Lemma 4 we have n ≤ |Sub(Out(S))|.
Modulo variable renaming we may assume that i 6= j implies dom (τi)∩ dom (τj) = ∅,
and thus that τ =
⋃n
i=1 τi is defined on T1 =
⋃n
i=1(Sub(Li)∪Sub(Ri)). Note that the size
of T1 is bounded by M×|Sub(Out(S))|, where M is the maximal size of a decomposition
rule belonging to the deduction system.
Let T = T0 ∪ T1 and, noting that these substitutions are defined on non-intersecting
domains, let σ′ = σ∪ τ . By construction the size of T is bounded by (M + 1)× |Sub(S)|,
and (M + 1) by the size of the deduction system (it has more than one rule).
By Lemma 2 there exists a (S, σ)-compliant derivation D′ which is (T, σ′)-maximal
and such that each deduction of a term in T0σ that occurs in D also occurs in D
′ and
no term is deduced twice in D′ by a standard deduction.
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Let l→ r be a deduction in D′ which does not appear in D. Since D is (T0, σ)-maximal
we have r /∈ Sub(T0)σ, and thus r /∈ Sub(Out(S))σ. Since no term is deduced twice in
D′ by Lemma 4 this deduction must be a composition.
Let us prove D′ is (T, σ′)-localized. By definition of composition rules, every composi-
tion that deduces a term tσ′ with t ∈ Sub(T ) \Var(T ) has a left-hand side t1σ′, . . . , tkσ′
with t1, . . . , tk ∈ Sub(T ) and t1, . . . , tk → t is an instance of a composition rule. By the
preceding paragraph every decomposition in D′ occurs in D and thus by construction
has its left-hand side in T1σ
′ which was previously built in D and is an instance of some
Li → Ri such that Sub(Li ∪ {Ri}) ⊆ T1 ⊆ T .
Thus every deduction whose right-hand side is in (Sub(T )\Var(T ))σ′ has its left-hand
side in Sub(T )σ′, and thus D′ is localized by T for σ′. 2
4.3. One-to-one localization
We prove now that to solve constraint systems one can first guess equalities between
terms in T and then solve constraint systems without variables. The guess of equalities
is correct with regard to a solution σ if terms in T that have the same instance by σ are
syntactically equal. We characterize these guesses as follows.
Definition 4.2 (One-to-one localizations). A set of terms T one-to-one localizes a deriva-
tion D for a ground substitution σ if σ is injective on Sub(T ) and T localizes D for σ.
In the following sequence of Lemmas, we first prove in 6 and 7 routine properties of
most general unifiers. They imply that from any unifier σ of a unification system U one
can build a most general unifier θ such that θσ = σ and more importantly Sub(U)θ =
Sub(Uθ). This property is employed in Lemma 8 to prove that once equalities between
subterms are correctly guessed there exists a one-to-one localization of a maximal proof
D whose size is linear (polynomial would have sufficed for our purpose) in the size of the
input constraint system.
Lemma 6. Let T be a set of terms such that T = Sub(T ), σ be a ground substitution
defined on Vars (T ), U = {p =? q : p, q ∈ T ∧ pσ = qσ} be a unification system and θ be
its most general idempotent unifier with Vars (img (θ)) ⊆ Vars (U). Then for any term t,
tθσ = tσ.
Proof. Let us show that ∀x ∈ Vars (T ) , xσ = xθσ. Note that this trivially holds if
xθ = x, and thus we consider the case xθ 6= x. Since U contains all equations p =? p
for p ∈ Sub(T ) = T , we have Sub(T ) = Sub(U). From the idempotency of θ (∀y ∈
Vars (U) , yθθ = yθ), we get ∀y ∈ Vars (img (θ)) , yθ = y. As σ is evidently a unifier of U ,
there exists a substitution τ such that σ = θτ Therefore, yσ = yθτ = yτ , i.e. yσ = yτ
for all y ∈ Vars (img (θ)). Thus, for any x ∈ Vars (T ), xθσ = xθτ = xσ. Consequently,
for any term t we have tσ = tθσ. 2
The following lemma is important for the complexity analysis as it shows that guessing
equalities between subterms and applying the mgu of the obtained unification system
actually reduces the number of distinct subterms, and thus the DAG size of the constraint
system
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Lemma 7. Let U be a unification system and θ = mgu (U) an idempotent most general
unifier with Vars (img (θ)) ⊆ Vars (U). Then for all t ∈ Sub(img (θ)) there exists u ∈
Sub(U) such that t = uθ.
Proof. Assume there exists terms in Sub(img (θ)) that are not equal to the instance of
a term in Sub(U). Since this set is finite, let t be maximal among these terms for the
subterm relation. If t is also maximal in Sub(img (θ)), then there exits x ∈ Vars (U) such
that xθ = t, a contradiction. Thus there exists a function symbol f and a term t′ =
f(. . . , t, . . .) in Sub(img (θ)). By the maximality of t there exists u′ ∈ Sub(U) such that
u′θ = t. If u′ is not a variable, the syntactic equality implies that u′ = f(. . . , u, . . .) with
uθ = t, again a contradiction. Thus there exists a variable u′ in Sub(U) such that u′θ =
f(. . . , t, . . .) = t′. The standard procedure computing a solved form U ′ of a syntactic
unification system U is such that Sub(U ′) ⊆ Sub(U) (before variable identification),
and the fact that u′θ is not a variable implies that U ′ contains an equation u′′ =? t
′′
with u′′θ = u′θ (the variables are identified in a subsequent step) and t′′ ∈ (Sub(U ′) \
Vars (U ′)) ⊆ (Sub(U) \ Vars (U)). Thus there exists t′′ ∈ (Sub(U) \ Vars (U)) such that
t′′θ = t′. Since t′′ is not a variable, it contains a subterm u (also in Sub(U)) such that
uθ = t. 2
Lemma 8. Let S be a constraint system, σ be a ground substitution such that σ |= S.
Then there exists a set of terms T , a substitution τ of domain Var(T ) \ Var(S), a
substitution θ and a (Sθ, σ)-compliant derivation D such that
• D is (T, σ ∪ τ)-maximal and one-to-one localized by T for σ ∪ τ
• σ ∪ τ = θ(σ ∪ τ)
• Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T
• T and θ are of size bounded by u×v×|Sub(S)| with u a fixed coefficient depending
on how data are represented, and v the size of the deduction system.
Proof. Under the same assumptions, by Lemma 5, there exists T0 ⊇ Sub(S) of size
bounded by v × |Sub(S)|, with v the size of the deduction system, and τ of domain
Var(T0)\Var(S) such that there exists a (T0, σ∪τ)-maximal and (S, σ)-compliant deriva-
tion D which is localized by T0 for the same substitution σ
′ = σ ∪ τ .
Let U = {t =? t′ : t, t′ ∈ Sub(T0) and tσ′ = t′σ′}. The unification system U has a
unifier σ′ and thus has a most general solution θ and by Lemma 6 we assume σ′ = θσ′.
Let T = Sub(T0)θ.
Since Sub(S) ⊆ T0 we have Sub(Sθ) ⊆ Sub(T0θ). Since θ is a most general unifier of
U and Sub(U) = Sub(T0) we have Sub(T0θ) = Sub(T0)θ by Lemma 7. This implies (i)
Sub(Sθ) ⊆ T , (ii) θ is of size bounded by u1×|Sub(T0)| and thus by u1×v×|Sub(S)|, with
u1 a fixed coefficient depending on how substitutions are represented, and (iii) T is of size
bounded by u× v× |Sub(S)|, with u > u1 a similar coefficient for substitutions and sets.
The exact value is left to the reader. Moreover, as σ′ = θσ′ we have Sub(T )σ′ = Sub(T0)σ
′
and thus from D is (T0, σ
′)-maximal follows D is (T, σ′)-maximal.
Finally let us prove that D is one-to-one localized by T . By contradiction assume
there exists t, t′ ∈ Sub(T ) such that tσ′ = t′σ′ but t 6= t′. Since T = Sub(T0θ) there
exists t0, t
′
0 ∈ Sub(T0) such that t0θ 6= t′0θ but t0θσ′ = t′0θσ′. This contradicts either the
definition of U or the definition of θ as one of its unifier.
From D is (S, σ)-compliant and σ = θσ we have D is (Sθ, σ)-compliant. 2
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4.4. Milestone sequence
In addition to retrace the deduction steps performed in D we want to track which
terms relevant to S are deduced in T , and in which order.
Definition 4.3 (Milestone sequence). A milestone sequence ~T is a finite sequence of
annotated terms ?t or → t. Let T be a set of terms, D = (li → ri)1≤i≤m be a derivation,
and σ be a ground substitution injective on Sub(T ). A milestone sequence ~T [1 : n]
is the (T, σ)-milestone sequence of D if there exists a strictly increasing function α :
{1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . ,m} such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have:
(1) if ~T [i] =?t then D[α(i)] =?tσ, and conversely if D[i] =?tσ then j ∈ img (α);
(2) if ~T [i] =→ t then D[α(i)] = li → tσ is a standard deduction rule; Conversely if
there exists t ∈ Sub(T ) such that D[i] = li → tσ then i ∈ img (α)
We are now examining necessary and sufficient conditions on a sequence of terms to
be a good milestone sequence of a derivation. Intuitively, we want to have guessed a
feasible ordering on the terms, and thus the first step towards such a definition consists
in defining places for terms in a milestone sequence.
Definition 4.4 (Positions in a milestone sequence). The position of a term t in a mile-
stone sequence ~T , denoted PosT (t) is either:
• ∞ if t does not occur in T ;
• or, if i is minimal such that ~T [i] = ∗→ t, the number of non-standard deductions in
~T [1 : i].
Given a term t /∈ X , we let Ωt be the set of instances of deduction rules whose right-
hand side is t.
Definition 4.5 (Indices in a milestone sequence). The indice of a (non-ground) instance
of a standard deduction rule t1, . . . , tn → t is denoted IndT (t1, . . . , tn → t) and is equal
to max1≤i≤n(PosT (tn)). The indice is extended to non-standard deductions by setting
IndT (?t) = PosT (t).
We can now define proper milestone sequences with regard to a set of terms T , i.e.
sequences of terms that are candidates for being the milestone sequence of a (Sub(T ), σ)-
maximal derivation. The two rules that have to be obeyed are (i) a term appearing as
deduced in the sequence must be deducible and (ii) this deduction must be performed
before the reception of any message. We express these conditions by comparing the
position of a term t with the indices of rules in Ωt. We add two other properties that
will permit to have a tight relationship between proper milestone sequences and maximal
derivations.
Definition 4.6 (Proper milestone sequence). Let T be a set of terms and ~T be a sequence
of ?t or → t, for t ∈ T . We say that ~T is proper with regard to T if:
(1) For every t ∈ Sub(T ), mind∈Ωt(IndT (d)) = PosT (t);
(2) For every indice i in ~T , x ∈ Vars
(
~T [i]
)
implies there exists j ≤ x such that
~T [j] =→ x ;
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(3) For every indice i such that ~T [i] =?t and ∗→ t ∈ ~T [1 : i − 1] either i = |~T | or
~T [i+ 1] =?t′.
5. Deciding constraint systems
Instead of trying to find a solution σ of a constraint system S, we focus on its satisfia-
bility by giving a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of existence of a proper mile-
stone sequence within certain bounds. Lemma 9 states that if a (T, σ) maximal derivation
D is one-to-one localized by T for σ then the (T, σ) milestone sequence of D is proper.
In Theorem 1, this lemma is employed to prove that if a constraint system is satisfiable
then there is a proper milestone sequence that can be connected to S. Thus guessing T ,
θ, and ~T , all of size polynomially bounded wrt the size of the deduction system and of
the constraint system and checking the properties of ~T is complete. Then we prove in
Lemma 10 that this algorithm is sound, i.e. that if a T , θ and ~T satisfy all the checks
performed then there exists a (S, σ)-compliant derivation D which is (T, σ)-maximal and
a proof of σ |= S. Finally, the termination of this algorithm is trivial since every check is
performed in time linear in the size of the constraint system and of the deduction system.
Thus the satisfiability of constraint systems is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial
time.
First let us proceed with the lemma essential to prove the completeness of our algo-
rithm by constructing a proper milestone sequence from a maximal derivation.
Lemma 9. Let T be a set of terms, σ be a substitution, and D be a (T, σ)-maximal
derivation which is one-to-one localized by T for σ. Then the (T, σ) milestone sequence
of D is a proper milestone sequence with regard to T .
Proof. Given the maximal derivation D and since T one-to-one localizes D for σ, we
construct the milestone sequence ~T as follows. Let n be the sum of the number of non-
standard deductions in D and of the number of terms in Sub(T )σ deduced by a standard
rule inD. We construct the partial strictly increasing surjective function α : {1, . . . ,m} →
{1, . . . , n} and the milestone sequence ~T as follows. The domain of α is the set of indices
i such that either D[i] is a non-standard deduction rule or a standard deduction rule
l → r with r ∈ Sub(T )σ. Since this domain is totally ordered and of size n, and α is
strictly increasing into {1, . . . , n}, it is uniquely defined and onto. For i ∈ Dom(β) we
define:
• If D[i] is a standard deduction l→ rσ with r ∈ Sub(T ), we set ~T [α(i)] =→ r;
• If D[i] is a non-standard deduction rule ?rσ with r ∈ Sub(T ), we set ~T [α(i)] =?r
By construction, and using the (into) function α−1, ~T is the (T, σ)-milestone sequence
of D.
Thus we just have to prove that ~T is a proper milestone sequence. Let N be the
number of non-standard rules in D, and i1, . . . , iN be the indices of these rules in D, and
ki1σ, . . . , kiNσ (with kij ∈ Sub(T ) for j = 1, . . . , N) be the messages received by these
rules. Note that by construction all the indices i1, . . . , iM are in the domain of α.
Let us prove the different points independently.
Claim 1. For every t ∈ Sub(T ), mind∈Ωt(IndT (d)) = PosT (t).
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Proof of the claim. Since D is (T, σ)-maximal, for every t ∈ Sub(T ), tσ ∈
Der(RD (i)) (for some i ≤ |D|) if, and only if, tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1). For t ∈
Sub(T ) let jt be minimal such that tσ ∈ Der(RD (jt)) (with jt = ∞ if tσ /∈
Der(RD (|D|))), and let Mt be maximal such that iMt ≤ jt. By construction every
jt <∞ is in the domain of α, and since the latter is strictly increasing we have in
this case:
α(iMt) ≤ α(jt) < α(iMt+1)
whereas if jt =∞ the term tσ is not deduced in D, and thus by construction is not
occurring labelled in ~T .
Since D is one-to-one localized by T for the substitution σ, for each standard
deduction l → tσ with t ∈ Sub(T ) \ X there exists t1, . . . , tn ∈ Sub(T ) such that
t1σ, . . . , tnσ are deduced before tσ in D and t1, . . . , tn → t is an instance of a
standard deduction rule. Since α is increasing, by construction the terms t1, . . . , tn
occur before t in ~T . Thus for all t ∈ Sub(T ) we have PosT (t) ≥ IndT (t).
Assume the subset H ⊆ Sub(T ) of terms t such that PosT (t) > IndT (t) is not
empty. If this set contains a term of finite indice, let t ∈ H be such that it is minimal
among the terms in H. Since t ∈ H, there exists an instance t1, . . . , tn → t of a
deduction rule such that max1≤k≤n(PosT (tk)) < PosT (t), and thus for 1 ≤ k ≤ n
we have α(itk) < α(iMt). Since α is increasing and into, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have
itk < iMt . Since t1σ, . . . , tnσ → tσ is a ground instance of a deduction rule, this
contradicts that the minimal i such that tσ ∈ Der(RD (i)) is greater than or equal
to iM , and thus this contradicts the maximality of D. Otherwise, if the H contains
only terms of infinite positions, there exists an instance t1, . . . , tn → t of a deduction
rule such that the maximum of PosT (tk) is finite, and thus t1, . . . , tk occur in ~T ,
but PosT (t) is infinite, i.e. t does not occur in ~T . By construction of ~T this means
that t1σ, . . . , tnσ ∈ RD (|D|), so since t1σ, . . . , tnσ → tσ is a ground instance of a
standard deduction rule we must have tσ ∈ Der(RD (|D|)). Since D is maximal and
tσ /∈ RD (|D|), we must also have tσ /∈ Der(RD (|D|)), a contradiction. Hence in all
cases H must be empty, and thus, for all t ∈ Sub(T ) we have PosT (t) = IndT (t),
and ~T is a proper milestone sequence. 3
Claim 2. For every indice i in ~T , x ∈ Vars
(
~T [i]
)
implies there exists j ≤ x such that
~T [j] =→ x.
Proof of the claim. If x ∈ Vars
(
~T [i]
)
then there exists corresponding deduction
D[j] that deduces term ~T [i]σ. Then by Lemma 4 there exists k < j such that D[j]
deduces by a standard rule xσ′. From the injectivity of σ follows that x is the only
term of Sub(T ) having σ image equal xσ. Thus, by definition of milestone sequence,
there exists m < i such that ~T [m] =→ x. 3
Claim 3. For every indice i such that ~T [i] =?t and PosT (t) < i either i = |~T | or
~T [i+ 1] =?t′.
Proof of the claim. Assume that i < |~T |, i.e. that ~T [i + 1] is defined. If ~T [i +
1] =→ s, then by construction we have D[α−1(i + 1)] = l → sσ, and thus sσ ∈
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(Der(RD (i))\Der(RD (i− 1))). This contradicts PosT (t) < i, as the latter implies
tσ ∈ Der(RD (i− 1)) and thus Der(RD (i)) \Der(RD (i− 1)) = ∅ 3
2
Conversely, a maximal derivation can be build once given a proper milestone sequence.
Lemma 10. If ~T is a proper milestone sequence for a set of terms T , and there is a
substitution σ and a derivation D such that ~T is the milestone sequence of D, then T
one-to-one localizes D for σ, and D is (T, σ)-maximal.
Proof. For each t ∈ Sub(T ) \ X such that there exists i with ~T [i] =→ t, let lt be a
set of terms such that, for each s ∈ lt, there exists j < i with ~T [j] =→ s or ~T [j] =?s.
Assume ~T contains N variables, i.e. modulo renamming Sub(T )∩X = {x1, . . . , xN}. For
x ∈ Vars (T ) we let cx ∈ Cmed be a constant not occurring elsewhere, and tx be either:
• If x ∈ Vars
(
~T
)
: the last received message before the deduction of x, or the nonce
c0 if no such term exists;
• Otherwise, a constant Secret no occurring in Sub(T ) nor in the rules of the de-
duction system (and thus not in Cmed)
We let σ = {x 7→ f(cx, txσ)}x∈Sub(T )∩X . Note this substitution is well defined by the
second property of proper milestone sequences. We define the sequence of deductions D
as follows:
D =→ c0,→ cx1 , . . . ,→ cxN , D~T
where the sequence D~T of deduction rules is defined by:
D~T [i] =

ltσ → tσ if ~T [i] =→ t /∈ X
cx, txσ → xσ if ~T [i] =→ x ∈ X
?tσ if ~T [i] =?t
Given the constraint on f , σ maps variables to distinct ground values that cannot
occur in (Sub(T ) \X )σ. Thus, by construction, D is one-to-one localized by T for σ. Let
us prove that D is (T, σ) maximal. To prove this, let t be an arbitrary term in Sub(T ),
and let i be an indice in D.
• If tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1) then since D is a derivation and NextD(i) − 1 ≥ i, we
have tσ ∈ Der(RD (i));
• Conversely, assume tσ ∈ Der(RD (i)). Let us prove that tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1). By
contradiction and wlog assume that i is minimal such that there exists t ∈ Sub(T )
such that tσ ∈ Der(RD (i)) but tσ /∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1).
· If t ∈ Vars
(
~T
)
, then by the second property of proper milestone sequences
there exists j with ~T [j] = t, jt maximal such that ~T [jt] =?s and jt ≤ j, and by
construction tσ = f(ct, sσ). Let D[α
−1(jt)] =?sσ. Given the third property
of proper milestone sequences, ∗→ s does not occur in ~T [1 : α(i) − 1]. Thus
by minimality of i we have ∗→ s /∈ ~T [1 : jt − 1] implies sσ /∈ Der(RD (i− 1)).
By construction if α(i) ≥ jt then in D we have tσ ∈ RD (NextD(i)− 1). If
α(i) < jt, since no non-variable subterm of T is equal to tσ, by Lemma 4 the
last deduction in a minimal derivation deducing tσ must be a composition,
and thus sσ ∈ Der(RD (i− 1)), a contradiction.
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· If t ∈ Vars (T )\Vars
(
~T
)
, since by construction there is no subterm of D that
contains the constant secret /∈ Cmed, tσ cannot be deduced from RD (|D|):
by contradiction, one would consider the minimal indice m in a derivation
deducing tσ such that secret occurs in the right-hand side of a rule. This
would have to be a composition, which is impossible.
· If t ∈ Sub(T ) \ X , we note that by definition of σ and since f does not occur
in any decomposition rule, we have lσ → tσ if, and only if, l → t. Since ~T is
proper, we have IndT (t) = PosT (t), and thus every deduction lσ → tσ is such
that at least one term s ∈ l is deduced in D at a step after i
2
We are now able to prove our main theorem which provides a sound and complete
criterion for deciding whether a constraint system is satisfiable.
Theorem 1. A constraint system S is satisfiable if, and only if, there exists a set of
terms T and a substitution θ both of sizes bounded by P (v, |Sub(S)|) with P some fixed
polynom depending on the representation of data, such that Sub(S)θ ⊆ T , plus a proper
milestone sequence ~T and a strictly increasing mapping α such that:
(1) (Sθ)[i] =!t implies ~T [α(i)] =?t and if ~T [i] =?t then i is in the image of α;
(2) (Sθ)[i] =?t implies PosT (t) ≤ PosT
(
~T [α(prevSθ(i))]
)
;
(3) (Sθ)[i] = \t implies PosT (t) > PosT
(
~T [α(prevSθ(i))]
)
.
Proof. If S is satisfiable then by Lemma 8 there exist T , σ, τ and θ as advertised by
this lemma, and a (T, (σ ∪ τ))-maximal (Sθ, σ)-compliant derivation D which is a proof
of σ |= S and one-to-one localized by T for (σ ∪ τ). Thus there exists a proper milestone
sequence ~T by Lemma 9. The fact that D is (S, σ)-compliant yields the first point.
The facts that it is (T, σ ∪ τ)-maximal, one-to-one localized by T for (σ ∪ τ) and that
Sub(S)θ ⊆ T yields the second and third points. Note that the sizes of T and θ are
already bounded thanks to Lemma 8.
Conversely, if there exists T , ~T and θ as advertised, there exists by Lemma 10 one
constructs from ~T a substitution σ and a (T, σ)-maximal and (S, σ)-compliant derivation
D. The properties of proper milestone sequences ensure that the conditions of Lemma 2
are met, and thus that D is a proof of σ |= S. 2
From the previous result we can directly derive a trivial NP-decision procedure for
constraint systems satisfiability: even if not formally computed here to avoid any depen-
dency on the way data are represented in practice, the polynom P bounding the size of
a set of terms is known and computable as soon as the representations of data (substi-
tutions, deduction system) are chosen. Assume v is the size of the deduction system. All
we have to do is to: guess a set of terms of size lower than |Sub(S)| × v, a substitution
θ of size bounded by P (v, |Sub(S)|), a milestone sequence ~T of length less than or equal
to |Sub(T )|, and check (in polynomial time) whether Sub(S) ⊆ Sub(Tθ), whether ~T is
a proper milestone sequence with regard to T and has all the requisite properties from
Theorem 1, and whether there exists a function α mapping the terms sent in the con-
straint system to their θ-instance in ~T . The NP-hardness is entailed by the NP-hardness
of solving constraint systems without negative constraints (Rusinowitch and Turuani,
2003). Note that the deduction system, and thus its size v, is part of the input data for
NP-completeness: the one shown for LOP in Section 2 was only an example.
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6. Implementation and computer experiments
6.1. Solving negative constraints in Cl-Atse
Cl-Atse is a Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (Turuani, 2006) for security pro-
tocols and services specified in HLPSL (Chevalier et al., 2004) or ASLan languages (Ar-
mando et al., 2012). It runs the protocol or set of services along all possible traces and
dynamically collects the constraints over terms and messages, over security properties,
etc. Therefore, Cl-Atse’s engine is primarily a constraint solver, reducing them down to
normal forms instead of bounding derivations. Cl-Atse only handles a special subterm
theory modelling symmetric and asymmetric encryption, that we call here Dolev Yao
theory. Since for our target examples Dolev Yao theory was sufficient we have preferred
to adapt the existing procedure of Cl-Atse instead of directly implementing the general
but highly inefficient decision procedure for negative constraints from previous section.
Let us recall the way the standard version of Cl-Atse works with positive constraints
only. The tool splits a constraints system into sub-systems and reduces them, while
preserving the set of solutions The main goal is to reduce sets of constraints systems
such that in all the ?t constraints t is limited to be a variable and all the ! constraints are
decomposed with regard to the new constraints that this may require. A system of this
form is said reduced, and (without \ constraint) it is easily satisfiable by filling variables
with fresh nonces created by the mediator at the start: all the ?X constraints can use
them directly. This points out that once a reduced constraint (without \ constraint)
system is reached, satisfiability is ensured by any assignment of the variables.
The tool has been extended with negative constraints (i.e. \) which serve as guards
during the reduction. Preserving the process already working for positive constraints (i.e.
?), the tool does not reduce \ as it does for ?. Instead, it uses it to eliminate sub-systems
that syntactically admit no solutions with regard to the negative constraints. Let CX be
a set of fresh nonces generated by the intruder at the start, and let C ′X be a set of fresh
nonces known by nobody (at the start of later). Let γ be an injective substitution from X
to CX ∪C ′X such that V γ ⊆ CX with V = Vars (In(S) ∪Out(S)), i.e. any variable shown
in at least one positive constraint get a value known by the intruder, and (Vars (S)\V )γ ⊆
C ′X i.e. any variable only shown in the negative constraints get a value unkonwn to the
intruder. We say that a constraint system S is contradictory iff there exists S1, t and S2
such that S = S1.\t.S2 and tγ ∈ Der(In(S1)γ ∪ Out(S1)γ). The tool does not compute
γ explicitly but simply consider variables like nonces for this test. The idea of this test
is to: i) have a fast, incomplete, test for eliminating obviously contradicting constraint
systems each time a reduced constraint system is reached: thanks to the Determination
any solution must satisfy the negative constraints at least syntactically; ii) see that on a
reduced constraint system, this syntactic test is sufficient to provide at least one solution:
we know that γ|V : V → CX satisfies the positive constraints as would any solution
filling variables with fresh nonces known only by the intruder at the beginning; but it
also satisfies the negative ones by definition of a contradictory system. Note that this
method to add negative constraints over an existing constraint solving technique only
works if the constraint solving algorithm for positive-only constraints produces reduced
systems of suitable type.
Finally, as pointed in i) this elimination test is fast: theoretically, the testing of Der
modulo γ is a derivation test in the ground case, which is known to be polynomial and
done by building a set of derivable subterms from which we can compose the target;
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however in practice, this ability is essential for reducing positive constraints, and already
exists in the tool. For example, the purpose of decomposing the ! constraints as pointed
above is precisely for collecting all the derivable subterms. This makes the test straight-
forward and limits the speed impact on the tool. Moreover, the tool does not reduce the
whole constraint system at once: instead, it builds it by successively adding new con-
straints and reducing the intermediate result, e.g. each time a choice is done on the next
protocol step to follow. Therefore, the contradicting negative constraints are eliminated
progressively, at each step. In the end, the processing of \ has not a large impact on
Cl-Atse computation time.
6.2. Integration in AVANTSSAR’s Orchestrator
The AVANTSSAR Orchestrator 3 (Armando et al., 2012) is a tool built over Cl-
Atse for automatic orchestration of web services along with their security policies. The
orchestration problem in this context can be reduced to a protocol state reachability
problem, which in turn can be converted into a classical protocol insecurity problem
where the adversary plays the role of a mediator. The transformation can be described
as follows: The available web services are mapped in a one-to-one fashion to security
protocol parties (roles); since services and roles are both represented by sequences of
message receptions and sends this transformation is straightforward (see details and
examples in public Deliverable 4.2 at www.avantssar.eu). The Client in the orchestration
problem is specified too as a sequence of message receptions and sends and therefore can
be translated directly to a security protocol role also called Client. This role is then
extended by a last step where it sends a special token End execution client signalling
that the Client has successfully finished its execution. Now, given the derived protocol
parties (corresponding to the available web services and the client) we ask, whether
the intruder can learn that special token issued by the Client, i.e. whether the intruder
knows that token at some point of some protocol execution (insecurity goal). All the
non-disclosure policies are added to the insecurity goal. Thus, the protocol insecurity
problem can now be stated in form: is there a protocol execution in presence of an
intruder, such that this intruder learns the token issued by the Client at the end, without
being able to infer the other messages stated in the non-disclosure policies ? If such an
execution exists, the actions of the intruder in this execution can be translated back to
a Mediator service satisfying both the Client communication requirements and all the
non-disclosure policies. The relevant execution can be found by the Cl-Atse procedure
for solving negative constraints as described in Subsection 6.1.
In practice, the AVANTSSAR Orchestrator also relies on the ASLan specification
language for web services created for AVANTSSAR platform, a translation tool ded-
icated to ASLan, and an analysis backend (possibly Cl-Atse) for validating the com-
posed specification produced. Negative constraints have been integrated, which now sup-
ports an extended variant of the ASLan language with negative constraints of the form
not(iknows(t)), where: t is a term; iknows(t) is a constraint requiring that t is de-
ducible by the intruder at the moment when the transition containing it is run; and
not(iknows(t)) is the negation of this, i.e. there must not exist any sequence of intruder
deduction rules capable of producing t at that time.
3 Available online at https://cassis.loria.fr/OrchestratorWI/.
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6.3. Experiments.
The LOP motivating example from Section 2, which is inspired by the Loan Origina-
tion case study from AVANTSSAR, has already been described in Section 2 and requires
non-deductibility constraints. Therefore, it is up to the AVANTSSAR’s Orchestrator to
generate a non-trivial mediator that is unable to deduce, i.e. even through calculations
and beyond simple eavesdropping, the client’s private data and is unable to invalidate
the security policy of any agent involved in the exchange.
In the standard AVANTSSAR framework, it was not possible to express directly non-
disclosure policies nor separation-of-duty policies. This gets now possible thanks to the
introduction of negative constraints in both Cl-Atse and AVANTSSAR’s Orchestrator.
For example, the client model in ASLan++ before this extension, i.e. without any nega-
tive constraints, is the following:
1. entity Client(Actor, Pep, M: agent, Amount: text) {
2. symbols
3. Ephemeral_key : symmetric_key;
4. Resp_A, Resp_B, End_execution_client : text;
5. A, B : agent;
6. body {
7. Actor -> M : {g(Actor).loan.Pep}_inv(pk(Actor));
8. M -> Actor : ?A.?B;
9. Ephemeral_key := fresh();
10. Actor -> M : {Amount.Actor.Ephemeral_key}_pk(A).
11. {Amount.Actor.Ephemeral_key}_pk(B);
12. M -> Actor : {h(A.Amount.Actor.?Resp_A)}_inv(pk(A)).
13. {h(B.Amount.Actor.?Resp_B)}_inv(pk(B)).
14. {|?Resp_A|}_Ephemeral_key.
15. {|?Resp_B|}_Ephemeral_key;
19. secrecy_End_of_execution:(End_execution_client) := fresh();
20. Actor -> Pep: {Amount.Actor.A.Resp_A.B.Resp_B}_pk(Pep).
21. {h(A.Amount.Actor.Resp_A)}_inv(pk(A)).
22. {h(B.Amount.Actor.Resp_B)}_inv(pk(B)).
23. End_execution_client;
24. }}
The ASLan++ term notation matches the one in this paper (e.g. {|M|}_K} is {|M |}K),
except that ?A designates the new value of A in the current action (probably a reception but
not only) instead of just the action that receives it. In here, the client played by agent Actor
communicates with his bank Pep and the mediator M from which he receives tho clerk’s names
A and B (at line 8) after sending his loan examination request (at line 7). Then, he encrypts
and sends his private loan data, simplified here to the amount itself, for the clerks through the
mediator (at lines 10 and 11). In return, he expects signed responses protected by his fresh
ephemeral key (at lines 12 to 15), which can then be used to contact the loan provider Pep (at
lines 20 to 22). The sending of token End execution client defines the client’s success (at lines
23). Once translated to ASLan using the AVANTSSAR’s Aslanpp connector, this role definition
can be extended with new guards:
16. not(iknows(Amount));
17. not(iknows(Resp_A));
18. not(iknows(Resp_B));
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ensuring that the client won’t successfully terminate the run by sending End execution client
if the intruder (playing the mediator M) is capable to build or deduce the loan’s amount or
any of the clerk’s private response. Similarly, the clerk’s ASLan model is extended with negative
constraints encoding separation of duty with the following idea: i) Any honest agent A taking a
role in the process sends a g(A) token to the mediator, like e.g. g(Actor) at the client’s line 7;
ii) Relationships between agents are modeled through encryptions known by the mediator, like
e.g. {g(C)}g(B) if C is linked to B, and vice versa; iii) when a new agent C is selected to be a
clerk, a negative constraint not(g(C)) ensures that there exists no chain of relationships of any
length that could link him to some agent already involved in the exchange.
As a result, we can show the effects of negative constraints in this application by experiment-
ing variants of the model where the mediator is, or is not, restricted by negative constraints and
where clerks are, or are not, available to the mediator:
(1) Without the negative constraints, and with or without any clerk, the Orchestrator finds a
mediator that assumes himself the role of a clerk, which is precisely the behavior we want
to avoid since further analysis will necessary reject it. This shows that if allowed to, the
mediator really has the knowledge needed to act as a clerk;
(2) With the negative constraints, but without any clerk, the Orchestrator does not find any
valid orchestration. This is logical since without any external agent playing as a clerk, and
with constraints like not(iknows(Amount)) preventing the mediator from being able to
deduce the loan Amount, and thus, from being a clerk himself, it is impossible to satisfy
the client’s request.
(3) With both the negative constraints and the clerks being available, the Orchestrator finds
a good orchestration, i.e. one where all the security policies of all agents are satisfied in
any trace. There, as expected the mediator delegates some parts of the process to the
clerks, which appears to be a needed condition for the secret data to remain secret and
non-deducible by the mediator.
For example, assume that the mediator’s initial knowledge contains a client name client, three
clerks’s names alice, bob and charlie, an entry for bob and charlie in the relational database (i.e.
rel(g(bob), g(charlie))), and the methods to communicate with these agents, then as expected in
the point (3) above the complete specification of LOP in our setting allow the tool to produce
a (new) mediator entity for this form:
1. entity Mediator(M : agent) {
2. symbols
3. Loan, Req1, Req2, HResp1a, HResp1b, HResp2a, HResp2b : message;
4. Pep : agent;
5. body {
6. M -> alice : request.M
7. alice -> M : g(alice).pk(alice) % Cannot create g(alice) before
8. M -> bob : request.M
9. bob -> M : g( bob ).pk( bob ) % Cannot create g( bob ) before
10. client -> M: {g(client).?Loan.?Pep}_inv(pk(client))
11. M -> client: alice.bob
12. client -> M: ?Req1.?Req2
13. M -> alice : Req1
14. alice -> M : {?HResp1a}_inv(pk(alice)).?HResp1b % Cannot create before
15. M -> bob : Req2
16. bob -> M : {?HResp2a}_inv(pk( bob )).?HResp2b % Cannot create before
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17. M -> client: {HResp1a}_inv(pk(alice)).HResp1b.
18. {HResp2a}_inv(pk(alice)).HResp2b
19. % Cannot create: alice’s and bob’s Resp, client’s Amount.
20. }}
7. Conclusion
We have obtained the first decision procedure for deducibility constraints with negation and
we have applied it to the synthesis of mediators subject to non-disclosure policies. It has been
implemented as an extension of Cl-Atse (Turuani, 2006) for the Dolev-Yao deduction system. On
the Loan Origination case study, the prototype generates directly the expected orchestration.
Without negative constraints undesired solutions in which the mediator impersonates the clerks
were found. More details, including problem specifications, can be found at http://cassis.
loria.fr/Cl-Atse. As in (Abadi and Cortier, 2006; Baudet, 2005) our definition of subterm
deduction systems can be extended to allow ground terms in right-hand sides of decomposition
rules even when they are not subterms of left-hand sides and the decidability result remains
valid with minor adaptation of the proof. A more challenging extension would be to consider
general constraints (as in (Avanesov et al., 2011)) with negation.
References
Abadi, M., Cortier, V., 2006. Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories.
Theoretical Computer Science 367 (1–2), 2 – 32.
Armando, A., Arsac, W., Avanesov, T., Barletta, M., Calvi, A., Cappai, A., Carbone, R., Cheva-
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